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252 PEOPLE V. CAVANAUGH [44 C.2d 
[erim. No. 5624. In Bank. Apr. 12, 1955.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. MICHAEL TIMOTHY 
CAVANAUGH, Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Instructions-Venue.-It is proper to instruct 
jury that territorial jurisdiction can be established by pre-
ponderance of evidence. 
[2] Id.-Evidence-Venue.-Territorial jurisdiction can be shown 
by circumstantial evidence. . 
[3] Homicide - Evidence - Place of Crime.-Implied finding of 
jury that murder took place in San Diego County and not in 
Tijuana where, according to defendant, fatal stabbing oc-
curred after he had driven victim there in his car, is sustained 
by evidence indicating that defendant would not have had 
time to make trip to Tijuana and to have moved victim's body, 
naked and bleeding as he claims, from back seat of car to 
the trunk without leaving traces of blood which would have 
been observed by border guards; by testimony of defendant's 
wife that she saw no blood in back seat when she looked there 
shortly after defendant's return; and by fact that defendant 
himself was not then bloodstained or disheveled. 
[4] Criminal Law-Argument of Counsel-Place of Crime.-State-
ment by prosecuting attorney in murder case that he did not 
know location of place of crime was not admission of failure 
of proof of venue where such statement was properly made 
in course of argument that place of killing could be inferred. 
[5] Id.-Evidence-Other Crimes.-A defendant cannot be re-
quired to defend himself against charge of any crime other 
than that for which he is on trial, but evidence which is 
relevant in establishing guilt of crime charged is admissible 
notwithstanding fact that it tends to connect defendant with 
offense not included in charge. 
[6] Id.-Evidence-Other Crimes.-Relevancy of evidence that 
proves crimes other than that charged must be examined with 
care, due to prejudicial nature of such evidence, and it should 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 135 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence, 
§ 309 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 750; [2] Criminal 
Law, § 568; [3] Homicide, § 152; [4] Criminal Law, § 617; [5, 6] 
Criminal Law, § 393(2); [7] Homicide, § 264; [8] Homicide, § 102; 
[9] Criminal Law, §§ 393(5), 393(9); [10] Homicide, § U5(5); 
[11] Criminal Law, § 443; [12] Witnesses, § 269; [13] Criminal 
Law, § 533; [14] Homicide, § 262; [15] Criminal Law, § 629. 
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not be admitted simply on showing that some part of that 
transaction is relevant to case. 
[7] Homicide-Appeal- Harmless Error - Evidence - Other Of-
fenses.-Though evidence of defendant's escape from state 
mental hospital and of his nonviolent crimes does not suffi-
ciently tend to show motive for or have enough relevanee 
toward proving violent robberies and commission of murder 
to have been properly admitted in murder case, admission of 
such evidence did not prejudice defendant or result in mis-
carriage of justice (Const., art. VI, § 4Y2) , where consideration 
of comparatively minor offenses against property could hardly 
have influenced jury one way or other in their appraisal of 
evidence as to crime against life. 
[8] Id.-Evidence-Other Crimes.-Evidence of defendant's con-
duct in connection with subsequent offenses of battery and 
robbery is relevant and admissible in murder case where such 
evidence tends to show striking similarity in significant re-
spects to his conduct in connection with murder charged in 
that in each case defendant viciously attacked and robbed 
victim with whom he had become acquainted when they drank 
together in a bar; in each case defendant told story of his 
drinking companion being in car with girl or girls whom he 
and defendant had "picked up" and of defendant returning 
to car to find victim bloody and beaten; and in each instance 
defendant was thereafter in possession of property of victim. 
[9] Criminal Law-Evidence-Other Crimes.-While it is often 
said that evidence of similar crimes is relevant to show plan, 
scheme, system or design, this is not to be understood as mean-
ing that such evidence is admissible only if it tends to show 
premeditated, calculated design, it also is relevant and may 
be admissible where it tends to show that defendant was guilty 
of crime charged by showing peculiar or characteristic be-
havior pattern of defendant which is manifest in conduct of 
transgressor in both crimes. 
[10] Homicide-Evidence-Killing in Perpetration of Robbery.-
A conviction of first degree murder is sustained by evidence in-
dicating that defendant murdered victim in perpetration of 
robbery, as shown by his subsequent possession of victim's 
property and his posing as victim. 
[11] Criminal Law-Evidence-Declarations and Admissions of De-
fendant.-Although extrajudicial statements of defendant are 
evidence which tends to prove truth of matter stated, they 
eonstitute admissions and are not vulnerable to hearsay objec-
tion. 
[12] Witnesses - Impeachment - Inconsistent Statements.-Evi-
dence of defendant's self-contradictions is admissible to im. 
peach him as a witness. 
) 
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[13] Criminal Law-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence.-Except 
in rare cases, dClIlon:,;trative evidence that tends to prove ma-
terial issue or clarify circumstances of crime is admissible 
despite its prejudicial tendency. 
[14] Homicide-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence.-Though no 
useful and proper purpose was served in murder case by 
emphasizing to jury, by repeated testimonial and photographic 
description, horrible condition in which victim's body was 
because of its having been left on desert, or by introducing in 
evidence fingers of deceased, and use of such evidence was 
improper and erroneous, such error did not require reversal of 
judgment where, in view of evidence lawfully adduced, no 
miscarriage of justice resulted. (Const., art. VI, § 4%.) 
[15] Criminal Law-Argument of Counsel-Comment on Defend-
ant.-District attorney's argument in murder case that de-
fendant's nonviolent crimes against property tended to show 
that defendant was sort of person who would viciously beat 
a person in order to rob him was not improper appeal to pas-
sion j rather it was improper reasoning, since resort to it might 
tend to weaken rather than strengthen case of prosecution, 
and however it be viewed it did not result in miscarriage of 
justice. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239) 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County 
and from an order denying a new trial or modification of 
the judgment. C. M. Monroe, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing 
death penalty, affirmed. 
Richard E. Adams, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, William E. James 
and Jay L. Shavelson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Re-
spondent. 
SCHAUER, J.-Defendant was charged by information 
with the murder of Ralph R. Welch, on or about July 23, 
1953, and with two prior convictions of felony (issuing a 
check with intent to defraud and issuing a check with no 
account). He pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason 
of insanity. A jury fonnel rlefendant guilty of murder of 
[13] See CalJur.2d, Evidence, § 204 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence, 
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the first degree and made no recommendation as to penalty;1 
the jury further found that defendant was sane at the time 
of the commission of the offense charged. No disposition 
was made of the allegations of prior convictions of felony 
and none appears to be necessary. This is an appeal from 
the judgment imposing the death penalty and from an order 
denying defendant's motion for new trial or for modification 
of the judgment by reduction of the offense to second degree 
murder. 
Defendant contends: There is no evidence that Welch was 
killed in San Diego County, California, as charged. There 
is no evidence of the circumstances surrounding the killing 
to show that it was murder of the first degree. Evidence of 
other offenses was improperly admitted over objection. Hear-
Bay evidence prejudicial to defendant was introduced over 
objection. Prejudicial error was committed by the intro-
duction in evidence of revolting and inflammatory exhibits 
unnecessary to the People's case. The prosecuting attorney 
was guilty of prejudicial misconduct in his opening statement 
and argument. We have concluded that the record discloses 
no error which, in the circumstances of this case, is ground 
for reversal. 
In April, 1953, defendant was committed to Patton State 
Hospital, an institution for the mentally ill, at his own 
request. Defendant gave a history of asserted "blackouts" 
during which, without knowing what he was doing, he would 
leave his home and write and pass bad checks. The psychia-
trist who examined defendant in connection with the commit-
ment to Patton found no evidence of any psychosis or physical 
condition which would cause amnesia and did not believe that 
defendant" blacked out, " but made the diagnosis" psychotic" 
because of defendant's desire for treatment at a state insti-
tution. On July 12 defendant left the hospital without a 
discharge and went to Chula Vista, San Diego County, where 
he had lived. Between July 12 and July 23 he cashed a 
number of bad checks. 
Welch had been honorably discharged from the Marine 
Corps on May 28, 1953, in Tucson, Arizona. He and his wife 
were living in Chula Vista on July 23, 1953, the alleged date 
of the homicide. 
On the afternoon of July 23 defendant was drinking beer 
'The jury had been instructed that such a finding and omission of 
neommendation as to penaltl would result in imposition of the death 
Mteaoe 
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at Thompson's Cafe in Chula Vista, about six miles from 
the Mexican border. At about 5 :30 p. m. he called a cab 
and went to various stores where he made purchases, includ-
ing a watch, and cashed or attempted to cash bad checks; 
he falsely represented that he was a doctor and a commander 
in the United States Navy. Defendant returned to the cafe 
at about 6 :30 p. m. Meanwhile Welch had entered the cafe. 
He and defendant then met for the first time. They talked 
and drank beer together. rfhe waitress heard Welch tell 
defendant that his head was bothering him and defendant 
say that he was a doctor in the Navy and "I will fix your 
head. " At about 10 p. m. Welch said that he would like 
to go home; he had indicated where he lived; defendant said 
that he would go with him because he too lived "out that 
way. ' , They left the cafe together. Welch was not seen 
alive again by any witness (other than defendant) who 
testified. 
The only direct evidence as to what occurred to and be-
tween defendant and Welch during the next hour and a half 
consists of conflicting extrajudicial admissions and testimony 
of defendant, and a "confession" of defendant that he killed 
Welch in Tijuana, Mexico. The People take the position 
that defendant killed Welch but not in Tijuana; defendant 
takes the position that Welch was killed in Tijuana but not 
by him. According to defendant '8 testimony, he and Welch 
went to Tijuana in Welch's 1951 Ford convertible; in Tijuana 
Welch said that he wished some food; defendant went into 
a cantina, leaving Welch in the back seat of the car; when 
defendant returned after about 20 minutes Welch was naked 
and had been killed by blows on the head and stab wounds 
in the chest; defendant, apprehensive of the Mexican authori-
ties, put the body in the trunk of the car and returned to 
Chula Vista. 
According to defendant's "confession," as distinguished 
from his testimony above related, he and Welch picked up 
two girls in Tijuana; when defendant returned to the car 
after purchasing the food Welch was sexually mistreating 
the girl whom defendant was with; defendant became enraged 
and beat Welch and stabbed him with a souvenir knife which 
defendant had purchased; the girls vanished; defendant put 
the body in the trunk, threw a way the knife and Welch'8 
clothes, and returned to Cliula Vista. 
Defendant was next seen (by witnesses who testified at the 
trial) at about 11 :30 or 11 :45 p. m.. of t1u same dq. He 
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came into the Club 13, near Chula Vista, had a beer, repaid 
a waitress $20 which defendant's ~if~ had borrowed, and 
gave the waitress $25 which he asked her to give his wife. 
lIe then decided to see his wife, drove Welch's car to her 
home, and they returned to the Club 13 and drank beer. 
They left the Club 13 a little before 1 a. m. Defendant 
drove his wife home. He told her nothing of Welch; he 
said that he would return to Patton State .Hospital and left. 
To show defendant's whereabouts after he left his wife 
and before he was apprehended the prosecution introduced 
evidence which disclosed that during this period defendant 
had committed various crimes. 
Defendant was in Kingman, Arizona, on July 25, 1953. 
Representing himself to be Ralph Welch, he pawned the 
watch he had bought on the 23d and received $10. 
On Sunday, July 26, in Santa Fe, New Mexico, defendant 
induced a priest to lend him $20 by representations that 
defendant was a student on his way to the University of 
Denver and had run out of funds. 
At about 6 p. m. on July 27, 1953, defendant sent 
two collect wires from the \Vestern Union office in Colorado 
Springs, Colorado. One was to Vol elch 's parents in Tucson, 
Arizona, and one to his wife in Chula Vista. Each was signed 
"Ralph R. Welch" and asked for $75. \Velch's wife wired 
the money as requested and defendant received it at the 
Colorado Springs Western Union office on July 28 after 
presenting Welch's identification. He asked the clerk to 
forward the other money order to Denver. She did so and 
defendant received and cashed it there. 
On the evening of July 29, 1953, defendant and a man 
named Jack Jones went into a bar just outside the city 
limits of Denver. Defendant seemed nervous and belligerent. 
He attracted considerable attention by announcing that he 
would burn a dollar bill and doing so. Defendant and Jones 
left the bar shortly after 7 p. m. 
At about 9 :15 p. m. on July 29 Denver police officers 
patrolling in a radio car went to St. Luke's Hospital pur-
suant to a radio call. Defendant had brought Jones to the 
hospital; Jones had severe head lacerations and a badly man-
gled left hand; all his pockets were turned out. Defendant 
told the officers that he was Ralph Welch of Tucson, Arizona, 
and that while driving through Denver on his way to Colum-
bia University he saw an injured man lying on the street, 
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from a small boy. After some conversation the officers in. 
formed defendant that he was under arrest. Defendant 
agreed to go with the officers to the Detective Bureau. As 
they passed Welch's Ford defendant said that it was his. 
The officers said that they would look at defendant's car. 
Defendant said, "You're not going to check my car" and 
ran down the street. The officers ran after him and shouted 
for him to stop. When defendant continued to run they 
fired several shots. One bullet hit defendant in the left 
buttock and he fell. Defendant was abusive and hostile; the 
two officers had to hold him. Other police and an ambu-
lance arrived and defendant was taken to a hospital. 
On the baclt seat and bacl< floor and in the trunk of the 
Ford was putrefying blood. On a jack found in the car 
was putrefying blood and also fresh blood. A tooth, part 
of a dental bridge, hair, and sun glasses, all subsequently 
identified as Welch's, were found in the car. In defendant's 
pockets were $178, a table knife, a bank book of Jack Jones, 
Welch's wallet with his certificate of discharge from the 
Marine Corps and his Arizona driver's license, and blank 
checks from the Chula Vista branch of the Bank of America. 
The Denver police ascertained that Welch was missing from 
Chula Vista. They questioned defendant repeatedly. On 
July 30, 1953, defendant said that he was Michael Timothy 
Cavanaugh of National City, California, that he had never 
heard of Welch, and that he had no recollection of what had 
happened to him on the night of July 29. On July 31 de-
fendant denied that he had known Jones or Welch or had 
anything to do with Welch's car. On August 3, taken to 
look at Welch's car, defendant said that it smelled as if it 
had contained a body but that he could not recall having . 
seen the car before. On the 4th and 5th defendant continued 
to deny that he had ever seen Welch. On August 6 an officer 
told defendant that the authorities believed defendant had 
killed Welch and that they were anxious to locate his body, 
and asked defendant whether he would submit to questioning 
under the influence of "truth serum." Defendant agreed 
to such a test and it was performed on the afternoon of 
August 7. 
Sodium amytal was administered intravenously and defend-
ant was questioned by a psychiatrist in the presence of police 
officers. A transcript of what defendant said was made but 
not offered in evidence. Defendant testified that he recalls 
beiDa at Uwt hospital au~ receivin" an injectioD. at the be-
) 
) 
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ginning of the test, that he then Jost consciousness and has 
no knowledge of what took place until he regained conscious-
ness in the county jail the next morning. 
After the questioning of defendant during the sodium 
amy tal test ended on Angust 7, 1953, an offieer drove defend-
ant to the jail. During their drive defendant gave an ac-
count of Welch's death on July 23 like that in his testimony, 
supra, page 282. Defendant said that he intended to take the 
body from Tijuana to the Chula Vista police; after he crossed 
the border he thought he should get the advice of his wife 
but when he met her he did not mention Welch; he then 
decided to take the body to Welch's parents in Tucson; instead 
he drove through Kingman and into New Mexico; he planned 
to turn the body over to the police in Albuquerque but be-
came frightened; by this time the body smelled so bad that 
he felt he had to get rid of it; he drove off the road into the 
desert, left the body covered with defendant's coat, and said 
a prayer or two; he then went on through Santa Fe, borro,\-
ing money from the priest, and Colorado Springs, wiring 
Welch's parents and wife for money, and to Denver, as herein-
before described; while he was drinking at a Denver night 
club on the evening of July 29 he met Jack Jones; defendant 
and Jones went to various night clubs, drinking heavily; 
they met two "fast" girls; Jones took one of the girls to 
the car to "have a party"; after about 30 minutes defendant 
went to the car and found Jones with his head beaten; 
defendant became frightened; he asked a small boy directions 
to a hospital; at St. Luke.'s defendant did not want to be in-
volved with the police because of his possession of Welch's 
car, tried to flee, and was shot and apprehended. 
From defendant's account of where he left Welch's body 
the Denver police gave the Albuquerque authorities informa-
tion which enabled them to find the body. It was so decom-
posed and eaten by vermin that the physician and pathologist 
who performed the autopsy could not determine the cause of 
death. The greater portion of the flesh and inner organs had 
been eaten away and the organs could not be identified. 
There were large holes in the chest wall; their primary cause 
could not be determined. The upper jaw was fractured in 
seven or eight places. Insofar as autopsic conclusions are 
concerned, death could have been from natural causes, from 
multiple stab wounds, or from a severe beating about the 
head and face. Enough skin remained on three fingers to 
enable .the taking of fingerprints; comparison of theae with . 
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W dch 's Marine records established identity of the body. 
There is no contention that the evidence as a whole fails t6 
establish that Welch came to his death by criminal means; 
defendant's own testimony is to this effect. 
On August 8, 1953. defendant, again questioned by the 
Denver police, said he remembered nothing of what occurred 
the day before. Defendant was returned to California in 
August but was not charged with the murder of Welch until 
February 25, 1954. On October 21, 1953. sodium amy tal was 
again administered intravellousJy and a psychiatrist ques-
tioned defendant concerning the death of Welch. The reo 
suits of this questionillg were not offered in evidence. The 
psyelliatrist testified that in his opinion defendant during 
the questioning was controlling his answers and shamming. 
On November 16. 1953, defendant was being tried before 
Judge Dean Sherry of the San Diego Superior Court for 
issuing checks without sufficient funds. Defendant's attorney 
stated in open court that defendant wished to make a state-
ment to Judge Sherry in the presence of the district attorney 
and outside the presence of the jury. The ensuing proceed-
ings in chambers were reported by a stenographer. Defendant 
was not coerced and no promises were made to him. He said, 
"It is my opinion I am in this court at this time for some-
thing I actually don't know, and I can't quite understand 
•.. being punished for something I do not know. I would 
much rather be punished for something that I do know ... 
I make the statement of my own free will and stand set to 
accept any consequences that may follow. Here, I have a slip 
of paper and my own signature .•. " Defendant then read 
from the paper, "I, Michael T. Cavanaugh, do admit by this 
self-written document that on July 23, 1953, at Tijuana, 
Mexico, I, Michael T. Cavanaugh, did kill one Ralph Welch 
as an aftermath of an argument resulting from a drunken 
orgy. Signed: Michael '1'. Cavanaugh." 
Defelldant proceeded to make the "confession" summar-
ized supra, page 282. Defendant said that he was so enraged 
by Welch's asserted mistreatment of the girl that he cut off 'V dch 's penis. (Actually, thIs had not been done to Welch's 
body.) After defendant completed his" confession," he said 
insistently that his claimed" blackouts" while writing checks 
were real; "I have no know ledge of writing the checks that 
you have charged me with .•. I just can't seem to be found 
guilty of somethin~ I don't know. and I would much rather 
have them shoot me for something I do know." Asked., 
) 
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" [1] n respect to the Welch affair .•• , do you contend that 
you were under any blackout conditions Y" defendant replied, 
"No, sir. I did not state that. . .. I am not making any con-
tention ••• that at the time I was in a blackout ... 1 just 
simply blew my top." 
The Mexican correspondent for a San Diego paper, who 
acted as interpreter at interviews between defendant and the 
chief investigator for the Tijuana police force, in November, 
1953, testified for the People that defendant made various 
statements as to where he had killed 'Velch and where he 
_ had disposed of Welch's clothes and the knife; the Mexican 
authorities checked each of defendant's stories, attempted un-
successfully to find the girls whom defendant said he and 
Welch had picked up and to find anyone who had seen de-
fendant in Tijuana, and found no evidence that a killing had 
been committed in Tijuana on JUly 23, 1953. 
Patrick 0 'Riley (who had testified for the People at the 
preliminary hearing and who was subpoenaed by both the 
People and defendant) testified for defendant at the trial as 
follows: He met defendant in the San Diego jail in November, 
1953, and for two months they were cell mates. They cor-
roborated in preparation of the "confession" which defend-
ant made to Judge Sherry because they thought that de-
fendant might receive a light sentence if he were tried for a 
homicide in Mexico. When flaws in the story were revealed 
by investigation of the Mexican authorities they changed the 
story in attempts to cover Up the discrepancies. 0 'Riley was 
playing diverse roles while he was in jail with defendant: 
he was dealing with defendant in what defendant believed 
was a good faith attempt to enable defendant to obtain 
lighter punishment; he was passing out information to con-
fuse the Mexican authorities; and he was working with the 
California authorities to get a confession from defendant. 
Defendant at no time told 0 'Riley that he had actually 
killed Welch or that he knew that Welch was killed in Cali-
fornia. 
As previously stated, defendant's testimony at the trial 
was that he and Welch went to Tijuana, that he left the 
car for a short time and found Welch's body when he re-
turned. Defendant repeatedly stated on the stand that he 
would only testify as to the killing of Welch; he said that 
he would not answer questions as to past prosecutions or as 
to where he got the money which he had at Thompson's Cafe 
()D the aftexooon of July 23; asked why he wired Welch's 
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parents and wife for money, he replied that he would only 
answer as to the killing of Welch in Mexico. 
A witness testified for defendant that as an experiment 
he had made a trip to Tijuana similar to the one described 
in defendant's testimony, starting from Thompson's Cafe 
at 10 p. m., stopping as indicated by defendant in his testi-
mony, returning across the border, and reaching the Club 
13 at 11 :26 p. m. 
Defendant, as previously stated, urges that there is no evi-
dence that Welch was killed in California. Section 27 of 
the Penal Code provides in material part that" The following 
persons are liable to punishment under the laws of this state: 
1. All persons who commit, in whole or in part, any crime 
within this state ... " Section 790 provides in material part, 
"The jurisdiction of a criminal action for murder or man-
slaughter is in the county where the fatal injury was in-
flicted or in the county in which the party injured died or in 
th? I.'ouuty ill whi"h hi.s b0d~' was found •.. " 
At the dose of the P~)pll"s e\·iJ.ell~~ 011 th~ issue of guilt 
defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that there was 
no evidence of jurisdiction, and after defendant rested he 
moved for an advised verdict on the ground of lack of proof 
of venue or jurisdiction. These motions were denied. 
The jury were instructed that "in order to convict the 
defendant you must find by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the fatal injury was inflicted upon Ralph Welch by the 
defendant in San Diego County,or that Ralph Welch died in 
San Diego County as a result of the injuries inflicted by the 
defendant. • • . Guilt, as I have repeatedly said to you, must 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. . .. As to the place of 
the commission of the crime, the law merely requires that it 
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence . • ." 
[1] The instruction to the effect that territorial juris-
diction could be established by a preponderance of the evi-
dence was correct. (People v. Megladdery (1940), 40 Cal. 
App.2d 748, 766 [106 P.2d 84] ; People v. Guernsey (1947), 
80 Cal.App.2d 463, 4G6 [180 P.2d 27].) [2] And such juris-
diction, like any other fact, can be shown by circumstantial 
evidence. (People v. Hill (1934),2 Cal.App.2d 141, 151 [37 
P.2d 849] ; People v. Harkness (1942), 51 Cal.App.2d 133, 
139 [124 P.2d 85].) 
[3] Here the jury could infer that the killing occurred 
in California from the following circumstances: Defendant 
and Welch left Thompson's Cafe at 10 p. m. and defendant 
) 
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arrived at the Club 13 in Welch's car at 11 :30 or 11 :45. 
According to a witness for defendant who made an experi-
mental trip to and from Tijuana similar to that described 
in defendant's testimony, such trip took one hour and 26 
minutes. According to defendant's testimony he was able 
to move Welch's bleeding body from the back seat of thf~ 
car into the trunk without getting blood on his clothes, an.1 
he wiped the blood from the car with a rag. According tc, 
defendant, he was frightened when he brought the bl)<ly 
across the border; he testified, "[I] held my breath while 
the man asked me where I was born and had I bought any-
thing and he shined his light in the front seat and in the 
back and just passed me through." There is' no evidence that 
defendant attracted attention during the check of cars which 
pass the border.2 Defendant's wife saw no blood in the back 
seat when she looked there shortly after defendant's return, 
and defendant himself was not blood-stained or disheveled. 
It is a reasonable conclusion that he would not have had time 
to mak~ the trip to Tijuana as he testified and still to ha,e 
moved the body, naked and bleeding as he claims, from the 
back seat to the trunk without leaving traces of blood which 
would have been observed by border guards, and that there-
fore he and Welch did not leave this state or San Diego 
County. The evidence that defendant believed he would re-
ceive a lighter punishment if he were tried in Mexico lessens 
the credibility of his statements which place the crime in that 
eountry. 
[4] Defendant asserts that the prosecuting attorney in 
argument admitted that the People had not proved venue. He 
refers to counsel's statement that "Mr. Adams [attorney for 
defendant] says that we haven't told you exactly where it 
[the location of the killing] is, and I think the Judge is going 
to instruct you in that regard. I don't know where it is. It 
IS going to be locked in this man's heart, probably forever." 
This was not an admission of a failure of proof. The state-
ment was properly made in the course of argument that the 
place of killing could be inferred. 
'A United States immigration inspector who was on duty at the place 
where defendant testified he crossed the border on the night of July 23, 
1953, described the procedure of checking persons who come into the 
United States in automobiles. Entrants are questioned and at night the 
inside of their cars is examined by flashlight; if they appear intoxicated 
they are stopped; if they are nervous or the questioning officer's suspi-
cions of illegal entry or customs violation are otherwise aroused they are 
detained for more thorough interrogation and search. 
) 
... 
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Much of the evidence of defendant's activity both before 
and after the killing of Welch tends to show the commission 
of crimes other than the one for which he was on trial. 
Defendant argues that the evidence of other crimes was not 
relevant to the crime charged and served no purpose except 
the improper one of prejudicing defendant. [5] Both de-
fendant and the People recognize the correctness of the state-
ments of law as to evidence of other crimes quoted in People 
v. Newson (1951), 37 Ca1.2d 34, 47 [230 P.2d 618], from 
People v. Dabb (1948),32 Ca1.2d 491,499,500 [197 P.2d 1]: 
"A defendant in a criminal action cannot be required to 
defend himself against the charge of any crime other than 
that for which he is on trial, but this rule does not exclude 
evidence which incidentally discloses the commission of another 
offense. Evidence which is relevant in establishing guilt of 
the crime charged is admissible notwithiitanding the fact that 
it tends to connect the accused with an offense not included 
in the charge. [Citations.] . .• [6] The relevancy of evi-
dence that proves crimes other than that charged must, of 
course, be examined with care, due to the prejudicial nature of 
all such evidence, and it should not be admitted simply on the 
showing that some part of that transaction is relevant to 
the case. The possibility of severing relevant from irrelevant 
portions should, in every case, be considered, thereby protect-
ing the defendant against reference to other crimes where 
it has no tendency to establish facts pertinent to the proof 
of the crime charged." (To the same effect see People v. 
Peete (1946),28 Ca1.2d 306, 314-315 [169 P.2d 924]; see also 
Fricke, California Criminal Evidence, 2d ed. (1950), p. 223.) 
Defendant urges that the p0r50ns who observed his activities 
in Chula Vista prior to his meeting with Welch could have 
testified to his presence in the town without describing his 
cashing of worthless cIleeks and Ilis falsely impersonating a 
naval officer, and that his flight after the ldlling could have 
been shown by witnesses testifying simply that they saw him 
in Kingman, Albuquerque, Colorado Springs, and outside 
Denver, without describing the crimes he committed there 
(pawning the stolen watch, criminally obtaining money from 
the priest and from \Velch's relatives, and mutilating United 
States currency). 
The People urge that the evidence that defendant escaped 
from a state mental hospital (not a crime; see 18 Cal.Jur.2d, 
pp. 251-252) and passrd b~d cheeks prior to the homicide 
was i,'clevant to show a motive for the homicide; i.e., that he 
.) 
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desired to escape from the neighborhood where he had done 
these improper things and that therefore he killed Welch to 
obtain his automobile and identification papers. And the 
People argue that the evidence that after the homicide de-
fendant pawned the watch which he had obtained by writing 
a forged check and defrauded a priest tends to show defend-
ant's need for money and thus tends to show that thereafter, 
still needing money, he attacked Jones in order to rob him; 
and the crimes against Jones in turn tend to show that de-
fendant killed Welch for the purpose of taking his property. 
[7] We do not believe that, according to logic and ex-
perience, the evidence of defendant's escape from the hospital 
and of his nonviolent crimes sufficiently tends to show a motive 
for or has enough relevance toward proving the violent rob-
. beries and the killing of Welch to have been properly ad-
mitted. (Sec People v. Glass (1910), 158 Cal. 650, 654-659 
[112 P. 281].) However, we have concluded that in the cir-
CUlllstances the admission of such evidence did not prejudice 
defendant or result in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., 
art. VI, § 4112.) Consideration of the comparatively minor 
offenses against property could hardly have influenced the 
jury one way or the other in their appraisal of the evidence 
as to the crime against life. 
[8] The evidence tending to show the more serious offenses 
of battery and robbery of Jones was relevant because of the 
striking similarity in significant respects between defendant's 
conduct in that case and in the case of Welch, tending to 
indicate in each case a purpose of defendant to acquire the 
property of a casual drinking acquaintance by force. (See 
People v. Peete (1946), supra, 28 CaJ.2d 306, 318.) In each 
case there is evidence tending to show that defendant viciously 
attacked and robbed a victim with whom he had become 
acquainted when they drank together in a bar; in e.ach case 
defendant· told a rather implausible story of his drinking 
companion being in the car for a short time with a girl or 
girls whom he and dcfendant had "picked up" and of de-
fendant returning to the . car to find the victim bloody and 
beaten; and in each instance defendant was thereafter in 
possession of property of the victim. [9] In this connection 
it should be observed that while it is often said that evidence 
of similar crimes is relevant to show plan, scheme, system, or 
design, this is not to be understood as meaning that such 
evidence is admissible only if it tends to show premeditated, 
ealculated design; it also is relevant and may be admissible 
) 
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where, as here, it tends to show that defendant was guilty 
of the crime charged by showing a peculiar or characteristic 
behavior pattern of defendant which is ma~ifest in the conduct 
of the transgressor in both crimes. (See People v. Burns 
(1952), 109 Cal.App.2d 524, 535-538 [241 P .2d 308, 242 
P.2d 91.) 
[10] Defendant argues that this is a case where the evi-
dence of the circumstances leading to the homicide is so 
uncertain that at the most it can be said only that defendant 
killed deceased and that therefore the finding that the killing 
was murder of the first degree should not be upheld (citing 
People v. Howard (1930), 211 Cal. 322, 329 [295 P. 333, 71 
A.L.R. 1385]; People v. Moreno (1936), 6 Ca1.2d 480, 481 
[58 P.2d 629]). Contrary to defendant's argument, the 
evidence which has already been related is sufficient to show 
that the jury could find that defendant murdered Welch in 
the perpetration of robbery, as shown by his subsequent pos-
session of Welch's property and his posing as Welch (see 
People v. Watts (1926), 198 Cal. 776, 788 [247 P. 884]), 
and that therefore the murder was of the first degree. (Pen. 
Code, § 189; see also People v. 7'homas (1945), 25 Cal.2d 
880, 895, 899 [156 P.2d 7]; People v. Bender (1945), 27 
Ca1.2d 164 [163 P.2d 8] ; People v. Valentine (1946), 28 Cal. 
2d 121, 135-136 [169 P.2d 1, 167 A.L.R. 675]; People v. 
Honeycutt (1946), 29 Ca1.2d 52, 59 [172 P.2d 698] ; People 
v. Peterson (1946), 29 Ca1.2d 69, 71 [173 P.2d 11].) 
[11] Defendant's argument that he was prejudiced by 
the use of hearsay testimony involves the peculiar contention 
that defendant's own extrajudicial statements are inadmis-
sible hearsay. Although such statements are evidence which 
tends to prove the truth of the matter stated, they constitute 
admissions and are not vulnerable to the hearsay objection; 
[12] also, evidence of defendant's self-contradictions was ad-
missible to impeach him as a witness. (Bonebrake v. McCormick 
(1950), 35 Ca1.2d 16, 19 [215 P.2d 728] ; People v. Southack 
(1952), 39 Ca1.2d 578, 585 [248 P .2d 12] ; see also 4 Wigmore, 
Evidence, 3d ed. (1940), § 1048.) 
Defendant argues that the prosecution improperly used 
evidence, unnecessary to the proof of the case against de-
fendant because cumulative, which was calculated, and could 
tend, to inflame the passions of the jury. The pathologist 
who performed the autopsy cut off the three fingers which 
formed the basi~ of fingerprint identification of Welch and 
they were introduced in evidence. There is teatimony that 
) 
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the body when found was in a revolting condition, badly 
decomposed, much eaten by vermin, and crawling with mag-
gots. Photographs of the body were introduced in evidence. 
'l'here was much testimony as to the smell of putrefying blood 
which was about Welch's car and articles found therein. Such 
articles (gravel, a blood-stained leather sleeve, a jack, a blood-
stained seat cover, a tooth, the car itself) were introduced 
in evidence. 
[13] Generally, "except in rare cases of abuse, demon-
strative evidence that tends to prove a material issue or 
clarify the circumstances of the crime is admissible despitf' 
its prejudicial tendency." (People v. Adamson (1946).27 
Cal.2d 478, 486 [165 P.2d 3].) This rule is another 
application of tht' principle, applied in the case of evidence 
of other crimes, that relevant evidence is not necessarily in-
admissible because of its tendency to prejudice the jury. The 
admission of gruesome and horrifying photographs and ob-
jects, over objection, has been repeatedly upheld by this court 
under the circumstances of the particular case (People v. 
Gomez (1930), 209 Cal. 296. 300 [286 P. 998]; People v. 
Harris (1934), 219 Cal. 727, 730-731 [28 P.2d 906]; People 
v. Shaver (1936), 7 Ca1.2d 586, 592 [61 P.2d 1170] ; People v. 
Goodwin (1937). 9 Ca1.2d 711. 714 r72 P.2d 551]: People 
v. Lisenba (1939), 14 Ca1.2d 403, 411-412 [94 P.2d 
569]; People v. Smith (1940), 15 Ca1.2d 640, 649 [104 
P.2d 510]; People v. Dunn (1947), 29 Ca1.2d 654, 659-660 
[177 P.2d 553]; People v. Isby (1947), 30 Ca1.2d 879, 892 
(186 P.2d 405] ; People v. Guldbrandsen (1950), 35 Ca1.2d 
514, 521-522 [218 P.2d 977]; People v. Osborn (1951), 37 
Cal.2d 380, 383 [231 P.2d 850]; People v. Reed (1952), 
38 Ca1.2d 423, 432 [240 P .2d 590]), although it has occa-
sionally said, of shocking evidence which was relevant but un-
necessary to establish the People's case, that" the prosecution 
is not to be commended for offering it in evidence" (People 
v. Burkhart (1931), 211 Cal. 726, 732 [297 P. 11] ; People v. 
Sisson (1934), 1 Ca1.2d 510, 511 [36 P.2d 116]; People v. 
Madison (1935),3 Ca1.2d 668, 679 [46 P.2d 159] [" Although 
we cannot give sanction to the practice of exhibiting un-
necessarily to the jury gory physical evidences of the crime 
which are calculated or likely to inflame the jury's delibera-
tions, nevertheless we cannot say that the exhibition during 
the trial of the bed or bedding [in which deceased was slain] 
necessarily was beyond propriety or had that effect. 
The questions whether the exhibit should remain and was 
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needed to substantiate and illustrate the expert and other 
testimony as to the shots fired and whether it would tend 
to inflame the jury to the prejudice of the defendant, were 
questiolls addressed in the first instance to the c1iseretion of 
the trial court"]; see also People v. Logan (1953), 41 
Ca1.2d 279, 285 [260 P.2d 20] [error, but not prejudicial, 
to admit photographs of defendant with bleeding victim at 
scene of crime, and of defendant with a baseball bat and 
the purse of victim at police station; "it is not apparent how 
the jury would be aided in solving the facts of the case by 
pictures showing defendant in the presence of the victim . 
. • • [The several relevant matters pictured together] could 
have been shown without the graphic connection of defendant 
and the victim which resulted from photographing them 
together"] ) . 
One California case has been found in which it was held 
that admission of gruesome photographs of the victim of 
a homicide was an abuse of discretion and because of this 
and other errors the judgment of conviction was reversed. 
(People v. Burns (1952), supra, 109 Cal.App.2d 524, 541-542.) 
The photographs were made after the autopsy. They were 
particularly horrible, and not a representation of the condi-
tion of the victim when she died, because in connection with 
the autopsy the head had been shaved and wounds and 
incisions made. The court said that admission of the photo-
graphs improperly crossed the line between "a photograph 
which is of some help to the jury in solving the facts of 
the case and one which is of no value other than to inflame 
the minds of the jurors." 
[14] Here no useful and proper purpose was served by 
emphasizing to the jury, by repeated testimonial and photo-
graphic description, the horrible condition in which the body 
was because of its having been left on the desert. No useful 
and proper purpose was served by introducing in evidence 
the fingers of deceased. The purpose for which they were 
received, identification, could be and was accomplished by 
testimonial evidence of a fingerprint expert. Without such 
testimony the fingers would have meant nothing to the jury. 
With such testimony, they were unnecessary. The use of 
this evidence, like the use of the irrelevant evidence of other 
nonviolent erimes, in the manner and extent to which it was 
done, was improper and erroneous. Nevertheless, by the 
mandate of section 41j:! of article VI of the Constitution of 




Apr. 1955] PEOPLE tJ. CAVANAUGH 
r44 C.2d 252; 2:>2 P.2d ::1 
269 
after examination of the entire record, that there has been 
a miscarriage of justice. Such examination of the record 
here leaves us with the view that upon the evidence lawfully 
adduced, and notwithstanding that improperly presented, no 
miscarriage of justice is shown. In a closer case the mis-
conduct related could well deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial and require reversal of the judgment. 
[15] Defendant '8 further contention that the district 
attorney was guilty of prejudicial misconduct ill oral argu-
ment to the jury is without merit. Neither the portions of 
the argument specificaI1y directed to our attention by de-
fendant '8 counsel nor other portions thereof are improper 
except in one respect. That exception is the argument that 
defendant's nonviolent crimes against property tend to show 
that defendant was the sort of person who would viciously 
beat a person in order to rob him. This argument is not 
an improper appeal to passion; rather, it is improper reason-
ing, and resort to it might well tend to weaken rather than 
strengthen the case of the prosecution. But however it be 
viewed, as previously indicated we have concluded that, in 
all the circumstances of the case, the presentation of this 
theory to the jury did not, by itself or cumulatively with 
other errors, result in a miscarriage of justice. 
For the reasons above stated, the judgment and order 
appealed from are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
Once again a majority of this court has permitted the 
use of evidence of crimes other than the one for which the 
defendant was on trial. As I said in my dissent in People v. 
Westek, 31 Ca1.2d 4,-;q, 484 [190 P.2d 9], where the evidence 
of other crimes was offered by way of impeachment, "While 
the majority base their holding in this case, that evidence 
of other crimes was admissible, upon the ground that such 
evidence was offered by way of impeachment, the effect is 
just the same as if it had been offered as a part of the 
prosecution's case in chief [as here]. If it would have been 
immaterial and irrelevant as part of the prosecution's case 
in chief, it was likewise immaterial and irrelevant as impea.ch-
ing evidence." I said there that "lip service" wCi.~ ~-air1 to 
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the rule. That has been done in the instant case where the 
rule is quoted at length as it was set forth in People v. Dabb, 
32 Ca1.2d 491, 499, 500 [197 P.2d 1], and then with legal 
dexterity, part of the evidence so admitted is held not preju-
dicial and the balance thereof is imaginatively held to be 
relevant "because of the striking similarity in significant 
respects between defendant's conduct in that case and in the 
case of Welch. • . ." There is no such similarity. The dif-
ference between the forgery of a check and murder should 
be apparent to almost anyone. Many people suffer from a 
need for money without resorting to murder to satisfy that 
want. There is also a great difference between assault and 
battery, and murder. 1'his evidence was only admitted for 
its inflammatory effect and to say that it shows a "peculiar 
or characteristic behavior pattern of defendant which is mani-
fest in the conduct of the transgressor in both crimes" is 
sheer sophistry. The only thing the prosecution needed to 
prove was where defendant had been prior to his arrest and 
that could have been done quite simply by witnesses who 
said merely that they had seen him in the various locations. 
There was no necessity of admitting evidence of alleged 
,crimes committed by him in those locations and the only result 
. to be achieved was that of prejUdicing the defendant in the 
eyes of the jury-the precise thing the rule of inadmissibility 
of evidence of other crimes was designed to prevent. Nothing 
could be more prejudicial! I have fully set forth in other 
dissents the reasons why evidence of other crimes should not 
be admitted (see People v. Peete, 28 Ca1.2d 306, 322 [169 
P.2d 924] ; People v. Zatzlce, 33 CaL2d 480, 486 [202 P.2d 
1009] ; People v. lVestelc, 31 Ca1.2d 469, 483 [190 P.2d 9]; 
People v. Dabb, 32 Ca1.2d 491, 501 [197 P.2d 1] [concurring 
opinion]) and it would be unnecessarily repetitious to repeat 
here what I stated in those eases. 
I also disagree with the holding of the majority that venue 
was proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The only 
evidence leading to jurisdiction is the inference that time 
did not permit defendant's story to be true. This inference 
is based on witness' testimony that defendant left the cafe 
at 10 p. m. and returned at either 11 :30 or 11 :45 p. m. and 
testimony that the driving time to and from Tijuana would 
be one hour and 26 minutes; that defendant could not have 
moved the body in 19 minutes. It appears to me that this 
inference is a far cry from the preponderance of proof of 
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I also disagree with the majority holding that the admis-
sion in evidence of the dreadful and horrible objects and 
photographs did not constitute prejudicial error. I agree that 
it could serve no useful or proper purpose-I also agree that 
its only purpose was to prejudice defendant in the interest 
of securing a conviction by any means. 
The majority has here condoned two highly prejudicial 
errors in the instant case: That of admitting in evidence 
testimony of other crimes allegedly committed by the defend-
ant; and photographs and objects which no normal or reason-
able person could view without revulsion and hatred for the 
one who had, allegedly, committed an act bringing about 
such a vile result. The first error could have had no other 
purpose than to tell the jury what a bad person the defendant 
was and had been; the other error would insure the result 
desired by the prosecution-that defendant be shown no 
sympathy by a horrified and inflamed jury. Under the facts 
of any case, no matter what the record showed, these errors 
would be prejudicial. In addition, we have the extremely 
dubious showing of venue. It appears to me that if we do 
not honestly recognize the prejudicial nature of such errors 
and move to correct t.hem, we shall be guilty of condoning 
such practices in the future and will, ultimately, deprive 
those accused of crime of due process of law in its most 
practical sense. 
I would therefore reverse the judgment. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
Had it been necessary for the jury to determine only 
whether defendant killed decedent in the perpetration of a 
robbery, I could agree that the errors committed at the trial 
were not prejudicial. The jury was also presented, however, 
with a very close question whether the crime was committed 
in California, and it was required to determine the penalty 
that should be imposed. The majority opinion concedes that 
unnecessary but highly inflammatory evidence and evidence 
of other crimes was erroneously admitted, and it is apparent 
from the record that the prosecutor deliberately presented 
his case with the purpose of inflaming the jury. I cannot 
say that he did not succeed in this purpose or that a different 
verdict would have been improbable had the evidence been 
excluded. (People v. Bemis, 33 Ca1.2d 395. 401 f202 P.2d 







Accordingly, the Judgment and order appealed from should 
be reversed. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 11, 
1955. Carter, J., and 'rrayuor, J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
